



# Samiran Dutta

PhD Candidate in Economics, Paris School of Economics  
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## Education

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<b>Visiting PhD</b> School of Economics, University of Edinburgh Hosts: Prof. Mike Elsby and Dr. Axel Gottfries	Spring 2025
<b>PhD Economics</b> Paris School of Economics Supervision: Prof. François Fontaine	2023–Present
<b>MRes in Economics</b> Paris School of Economics	2021-2023 <i>Summa Cum Laude</i>
<b>B.A. in Economics</b> Ramjas College, University of Delhi	2017-2020 <i>First Division</i>

## Research Interests

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Macroeconomics, Labour Economics, Growth and Productivity

## Publications

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**The Role of Services in Indias Post-Reform Economic Growth** with B.N. Goldar and P.C. Das  
*Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 2024

## Working Papers

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**Investigating the Missing Middle in Indian Manufacturing** with B.N. Goldar and P. Majumder  
*SSRN Working Paper*, 2023

## Work in Progress (Selected)

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### **The Reserve Army of Labor: Dual Labor Markets and Firm Dynamics**

(Solo authored)

This paper develops a search-and-matching model of large firms with productivity heterogeneity, dual labor markets, and unionized wage bargaining. Firms hire through two channels a regular labor market with matching frictions, adjustment costs, and collective bargaining, and a contract labor market where contractors supply workers for a per-head fee without frictions. Adjustment costs generate inaction regions in regular employment consistent with novel establishment-level evidence from Indias manufacturing sector while contract labor provides a flexible margin to absorb productivity shocks. Larger firms strategically "overemploy" contract workers, using them not only as a substitute input but also to exert downward pressure on union-negotiated regular worker wages. The model replicates key empirical patterns in Indias manufacturing sector, where contract workers function as a de facto "reserve" workforce, offering flexibility and surplus value through wage compression. The framework highlights an outputwage trade-off contract labor reduces misallocation by easing adjustment but simultaneously weakens collective bargaining, compressing regular wages.

## Road Networks and Intra-Sector Misallocation: Theory and Evidence from India

(with François Fontaine and S. C. Mudigonda)

Investing in infrastructure is a major policy tool for developing nations. India's Golden Quadrilateral project was one such project, aimed at improving the quality and width of existing highways connecting the four largest metropolitan cities in India. The previous literature has focused on the first-order effect of improved efficiency through lower transportation costs. In contrast, we focus on the intra-sector general equilibrium effect of improved road networks. A firm's market position can strengthen or weaken depending on whether its competitors obtain superior connectivity through the upgraded highway network. Leveraging panel data on India's manufacturing firms, combined with an instrument variable strategy, we find that relative increase in road exposure for a competitor firm reduces a given firm's value-added and increases expenditure on materials. To quantify the general equilibrium effects, we build a model of internal trade among heterogeneous firms with differential access to road networks and transport costs.

## Unions, Hold-up, and Joint Dynamics of Labor and Capital

(with Alex McQuitty)

## Conferences and Seminars

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**2025:** 20th Annual Conference on Economic Growth & Development, ISI Delhi; PSE Macro Workshop; Labor/Public Reading Group, Sciences Po; Macro Reading Group, School of Economics, UOE

**2024:** PSE Macro Workshop; PSE Development Seminar

**2023:** 18th Annual Conference on Economic Growth & Development, ISI Delhi

**2022:** Seventh World KLEMS Conference, University of Manchester (virtual)

**2021:** 36th IARIW General Conference (virtual); Sixth KLEMS Conference, Harvard University (virtual)

## Grants

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**PSE International Mobility Grant**, Paris School of Economics Spring 2025

**EUR PjSE Research Grant**, Paris School of Economics 2025-26

## Academic Experience

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### Teaching

**Applied Econometrics, Graduate** Spring 2025, 2026

TA for Prof. Nicolas Jacquemet

Paris School of Economics/Université Paris Cité/Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne

**Introduction to Econometrics, Graduate** Fall 2024, 2025

TA for Prof. Angelo Secchi

Paris School of Economics/Université Paris Cité/Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne

**International Trade Theory, Undergraduate** Spring 2024

TA for Prof. Léa Marchal

Université Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne

**Macroeconomics, Graduate** Fall 2023

TA for Prof. François Fontaine

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

### Research Assistance

**India-KLEMS Project** 2020-21

RA under the India-KLEMS team, for the India Productivity Report ([link](#))

CDE, Delhi School of Economics; in collaboration with the Reserve Bank of India

## Academic References

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**François Fontaine**  
Professor  
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**Mike Elsby**  
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**Axel Gottfries**  
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**K. L. Krishna**  
Emeritus Professor  
Delhi School of Economics  
[krishna@econdse.org](mailto:krishna@econdse.org)

## Languages

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Hindi (native); Bengali (native); English (proficient)

## Programming Skills

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R, Julia, Matlab,  $\LaTeX$